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The Year of Morocco:  
An Introduction 
Dan Paracka 
Marking the 35th anniversary of Kennesaw State University’s award-winning 
Annual Country Study Program, the 2018-19 academic year focused on Morocco 
and consisted of 22 distinct educational events, with over 1,700 people in 
attendance. It also featured an interdisciplinary team-taught Year of Morocco 
(YoM) course that included a study abroad experience to Morocco (March 28-April 
7, 2019), an academic conference on “Gender, Identity, and Youth Empowerment 
in Morocco” (March 15-16, 2019), and this dedicated special issue of the Journal 
of Global Initiatives. Most events were organized through six different College 
Spotlights titled: The Taste of Morocco; Experiencing Moroccan Visual Arts; 
Multiple Literacies in Morocco; Conflict Management, Peacebuilding, and 
Development Challenges in Morocco, Moroccan Cultural Festival; and Moroccan 
Solar Tree. There were also five YoM Learning Modules developed for use in 12 
different classes across three colleges, and directly involving 375 students. As in 
the past, a semester-long senior-level graphic design class developed the Year of 
Morocco logo. 
The breadth and depth of these programs provided a strong basis for 
understanding Morocco in its historical and contemporary contexts. Participating 
faculty integrated these programs within existing coursework thus allowing for 
further investigation and analysis. For example, one faculty member worked with 
KSU students to offer curricular modules focused on Morocco at local area schools. 
A graduate art student assisted in creating an interactive Arts of Morocco timeline 
game which was delivered at Renaissance Elementary in Fulton County. In 
addition, undergraduate art students learned traditional Moroccan designs and zellij 
clay-making processes which they taught to 30 middle school students at Pine 
Mountain Middle School in Cobb County.  
The Morocco Solar Tree project involved students enrolled (Fall 2018) in the 
courses Solar Power (EE4405), and Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Senior 
Project (EE4800, ME4201, ME4202) courses. These students formed 
multidisciplinary teams and competed to design a Year of Morocco Solar Tree. 
Students from the winning team built and installed the tree on the Marietta campus 
(Spring 2019). The solar tree is a permanent mechanical structure mimicking a real 
tree with small solar modules attached to its branches to harvest solar energy. 
Electrical energy produced by the tree now illuminates a KSU logo at night, 
showcasing KSU’s commitment to sustainability and highlighting Morocco’s major 
efforts at developing alternative energy sources. Indeed, Morocco’s Noor-
Ouarzazate Solar Power Complex will be the world’s largest solar plant (580MW) 
when completed in 2020. 
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Students in these classes and many others developed a nuanced appreciation of 
Morocco and its diversity, strengths, and challenges. This appreciation was 
demonstrated in course projects, research papers, conference presentations, and 
Model Arab League and Model African Union simulations. For example, two 
presentations on literacy in Morocco were delivered by KSU students at the Year 
of Morocco Conference in March 2019, with one team also presenting their research 
at the National Conference on Undergraduate Research conference in April 2019. 
As a faculty advisor commented, “these students’ future career goals and 
trajectories of scholarship have been significantly impacted through their 
involvement.” The Multiple Literacies project provided the Bagwell College of 
Education Literacy Center with new acquisitions of children’s books and scholarly 
books related to Morocco, Islam, and literacy in the MENA region. Through the 
Morocco Library Project lecture, KSU faculty, staff, and students along with the 
Fulton County Public Library at Ocee were inspired to donate more than 12 boxes 
of English language children’s books to the Children’s Medina Library in Fez, 
Morocco. In addition to the donated books from the Ocee Library, advanced French 
students wrote and illustrated their own children’s books about Moroccan culture 
which also were donated to the Children’s Medina Library in Fez.  
As one of the major culminating events, the YoM Conference brought in a 
leading expert on women and youth in Morocco who delivered what one attendee 
described as an “incredibly powerful” keynote address. There were just over 90 
KSU faculty and students at the conference as well as 30 off-campus guests. The 
conference was also attended by seven visiting scholars from Hassan II University 
Casablanca (H2UC), and featured an ecstatically well-received concert by Innov 
Gnawa, a Grammy-nominated music group originally from Morocco and currently 
based in New York City. The concert was co-sponsored with the Center for African 
and African Diaspora Studies and was attended by over 230 people, many from the 
local Moroccan-American community. Gnawan ritual trance music has its roots 
with enslaved soldiers brought to Morocco from sub-Saharan West Africa, their 
trauma of displacement, worship of ancestral spirits, tradition of praise songs, and 
sufi mysticism (el Hamel, 2008, pp. 247-256). A highly regarded five-star Atlanta 
restaurant, Imperial Fez, catered the conference and helped promote the concert. 
Formal and informal evaluation feedback from the YoM conference showed that 
the conference was a resounding success, especially for junior scholars from outside 
KSU for the networking that occurred. Collaborative partners that helped promote 
the conference and attract the participation of scholars by posting announcements 
in their newsletters, websites, and listservs included the Friends of Morocco, 
Fulbright, and the American Institute for Maghreb Studies. 
As in previous years, the YoM resulted in new courses and curriculum, research 
projects, education abroad programs, grant writing, publications, and global 
partnerships. These initiatives directly contributed to student learning, academic 
scholarship, and community engagement. As one of the faculty members in the 
YoM learning community reflected, “to grasp the full complexity of the Year of 
Morocco one must appreciate that in actuality it takes at least three years to propose, 
develop, manage, and execute, to say nothing of the follow up, the consequences, 
and the efforts put toward sustainability and future growth.” The “Year of” program 
Dan Paracka   3 
is a strategic investment made by the university and its faculty that provides long-
lasting and diverse learning experience for our students. It involves broad outreach 
and engaged collaborations with important community partners. In this regard, the 
program benefitted through its established international partnership with H2UC.  
KSU’s partnership with H2UC began in January 2005, when KSU President 
Dr. Betty Siegel (1981-2006) visited Morocco to meet H2UC President Dr. Rahma 
Bourquia. The partnership was codified with the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding by both institutions in 2007. More than 100 KSU faculty, students, 
administrators, and staff have visited Morocco and about 30 faculty, students, and 
administrators from Hassan II have been hosted by KSU. Past KSU collaborative 
projects in Morocco have included the following: 
• The creation of a master’s degree program in American studies at 
Hassan II University and involvement in the establishment of the 
Morocco American Studies Association.  
• A compilation of oral histories, production of a documentary video, 
and creation of the Ben M’sik Community Museum (BMCM) in 
Casablanca.  
• A 2011 grant awarded by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of 
Education and Cultural Affairs and the American Association of 
Museums to fund the creation of an online exhibit titled “Identities: 
Understanding Islam in a Cross Cultural Context” 
(www.marb.kennesaw.edu/identities). This intercultural exchange 
and collaborative partnership continues, currently developing 
additional exhibits on “Morocco in World War II” and “Morocco, the 
United States and the Slave Trade.” 
• Participation in Morocco’s Annual International University Theater 
Festival in Casablanca (FITUC) including an award-winning 
production of an adaptation of Herman Melville’s Moby Dick 
performed by KSU’s students both at KSU and H2UC.  
• Work with low-income Artisan groups in Morocco who are designing 
new art products that preserve indigenous arts and crafts traditions. In 
Marrakesh, this project included work with Anarouz, a social 
enterprise cooperative engaging more than 2,000 local artisans and 
their families and communities. 
• Funding of a KSU Strategic Internationalization Grant to interview 
and conduct research on women leaders in Morocco.  
These projects provided a strong basis for the designation of the 2018-2019 
academic year as the “Year of Morocco” at KSU and led to H2UC being named the 
2019 KSU Distinguished International Community Partner.  
In addition to the seven H2UC faculty who visited KSU for the YoM 
conference, 23 KSU students and seven faculty visited the Ben M’sik campus in 
Casablanca as part of the team-taught spring-break study abroad experience. The 
study abroad program visited four cities: Marrakech, Casablanca, Fez, and Tangier. 
This itinerary helped participants experience Morocco’s cultural diversity. 
Highlights of the experience included planting trees with the High Atlas 
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Foundation, visiting the Amal Women’s cooperative, donating books to the Medina 
Children’s Library, visiting the Tangier American Legation Museum (TALIM), and 
interacting with Hassan II faculty and students. While abroad, our students and 
faculty were interviewed by and appeared on Morocco National Television.  
These projects all helped to advance campus internationalization and a more 
nuanced and scholarly understanding of Morocco—especially as it relates to 
important issues that impact both Morocco and the United States. As Clifford 
Geertz, who has written extensively about Morocco, argues in The Interpretation of 
Cultures understanding cultures necessarily involves the craft of interpretation, a 
constantly changing, relational process. The following introductory essay on 
Morocco was developed to help undergraduate students appreciate Morocco’s rich 
cultural heritage and complex place in a global society. 
 
Introductory Essay on Morocco 
Amazigh, Arab, Sub-Saharan African, and European identities are among the 
many influences on Moroccan identity. A geographic and cultural crossroads, it is 
a country continuously negotiating its place in today’s changing world. It is both a 
constitutional monarchy and an Islamic state that protects the rights of other 
religious communities to exist and to practice. Its history is one of extensive 
diplomatic relations with the enduring influence of the monarchy being one of its 
most salient characteristics.  
A sustained history of intercultural and commercial interactions in what is now 
Morocco has taken place among diverse civilizations such as Amazigh, Phoenician, 
Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Andalusian, Egyptian, and Ottoman. Morocco has 
also had long-lasting and substantial trade with sub-Saharan African empires such 
as the Ghana, Mali, Songhai, and Sosso. From 1912 to 1956, it was a colony of 
France and Spain, with Tangier as an International Zone administered by several 
European powers. 
The Amazigh (meaning freeborn in Tamazight) or Berbers (connoting 
uncivilized non-speakers of Greek/Latin), are the indigenous early inhabitants of 
Morocco.1 At present, approximately 40-45% of Moroccans speak one of three 
Amazigh languages: Tamazight, Tashlheit, or Tarifit (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 
1). According to Phillip Naylor (2009), the Amazigh have “evinced an ability to 
adapt to and to absorb other cultures. Their transcultural receptivity has 
distinguished their culture” (p. 4). On the other hand, they have been a major force 
of resistance against foreign invaders, and the Romans, Arabs, French, and Spanish 
all lauded the Amazigh’s desire for freedom and independence (Maddy-Weitzman, 
2011, pp. 177-178). Retaining their culture and language amidst relentless pressure 
to change has been a constant struggle.  
 
 
 
 
1 I will use Amazigh rather than Berber throughout this essay except when quoting other 
works. 
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The Spread of Arabic and Islam across the Maghreb 
Islamic states have generally controlled Moroccan territory since the Arab 
invasions of the 7th century. Arab influence has been significant, with Arabic and 
Islam permeating North African societies. Arabic became the language of learning, 
diplomacy, and trade throughout the region, which came to be known as al-Maghrib 
or “west.” The relationship between trade and Islam was especially close (Brett, 
1999, p. 62). Notably, as Dunn (1986) observed, “one of the strengths of an 
expanding Islam was its successful adaptability to local patterns of culture” (p. xix). 
Its focus on ensuring successful business relationships contributed to its emphasis 
on cultural adaptability. 
It was the Umayyad caliphate (661-750), which was based in Damascus, that 
initially conquered North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula (al-Andalus). The 
Umayyads did not force Jews and Christians (dhimmi, or “peoples of the book”) to 
convert but required them to pay a tax (jizya) that Muslims did not have to pay. In 
the Maghreb, as Bennison (2014) highlights, 
 
[t]he Islamic conquest itself was a long drawn-out process that involved 
ongoing interactions between two tribal peoples, the Arab invaders and the 
indigenous Maghribis, the latter of whom came to be lumped together in 
Arabic writing as the Berbers although they did not see themselves as a 
single ethnos. Indigenous tribes fought the newcomers, allied with them 
and rebelled against them. Such high levels of conflict slowed the pace of 
conquest but also generated intimacy through recruitment and the capture 
of Berber prisoners, male and female, who entered Arab Muslim ranks in 
a way that sedentary peasant populations, many of whom were Christian 
and thus inscribed in the new order as tax-paying ahl al-dhimmi, did not. 
(p. 139) 
 
Across the Maghreb, the Amazigh’s desire to preserve their autonomy and select 
their own leaders contributed to ever-changing alliances, for example, between 
Sunni Umayyads, Khariji, Ibadi, Sufi, Sunni Abbasids, Fatimids, and Umayyad 
Andalusian Islamic groups. As Bennison (2016) notes, the Khariji message “that 
the caliph should be selected for his qualities as a Muslim and a leader rather than 
because of ancestry was appealing to Berber troops who resented their inferior 
status to the Arabs” (p. 12). It was the Umayyad rulers’ excessive demands for 
extraordinary taxes and slave tributes from Amazigh Muslim converts that was the 
primary reason for the “Great Berber Revolt” or “Kharijite Revolt” of 739-743, the 
first successful secession from the Umayyad caliphate. Having broken away, the 
more moderate forms of Sufri Kharijites and Ibadi Kharijites in their Amazigh 
interior strongholds of the Atlas Mountains did not continue to pursue warfare 
against Muslims of other sects and maintained a tolerant attitude toward both 
Christian and Jewish communities (Bennison, 2016, p. 232).  
Writes Brett (1999), “The overthrow of the Umayyads by the Abbasids in 750, 
however, was not a victory for the doctrine of Kharijism . . . but a triumph of the 
call for a member of Muhammad’s family” (p. 59). After the overthrow of the 
Umayyads by the Abbasids (750-1258), who were based in Baghdad, North Africa 
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became a decentralized network of largely independent Islamic states. The 
Abbasids emphasized their religious authority but did not exercise as much direct 
political authority over these states. One such state, the Idrisids (789-920) of 
Morocco promoted widespread commercial and cultural exchange, especially with 
Umayyad al-Andalus, a region which had long been an important trading center. 
The establishment of the Moroccan monarchy (one of the oldest in the world) dates 
to Idriss, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (Sater, 2010, p. 3).  
Idriss I and Abd al-Rahman I had fled Abbasid rule to Morocco and al-Andalus 
respectively, claiming sharifian status (descent from the Prophet) and establishing 
new states. Abd al-Rahman I was the son of an Amazigh mother as was Idris’s son 
Idriss II. Being the proclaimed royal offspring of Arab rulers and conquered peoples 
aided in establishing local legitimacy. As Menocal (2002) points out, “Umayyad 
princes descended from the caliphs of Arabia and Syria were also visibly their 
mothers’ sons” (p. 67). The practice of intermarriage with conquered peoples was 
also evidenced during the reign of Ali ibn Yusuf, an Amazigh ruler of Almoravid 
Andalusia descent whose mother was a Christian (Rosser-Owen, 2014, p. 169). 
Generally, racial and ethnic distinctions were less emphasized under Arab 
patrilineal ideas as compared to those of Europe (Bennison, 2016, p. 180). 
Genealogy and kinship have been critical concerns for establishing the authority of 
Muslim leaders in the Arab world. As Rosser-Owen (2014) notes, “Berber regimes 
. . . deliberately constructed Arab genealogies to legitimize their rule in the Islamic 
West” (p. 155).  
After being overthrown, the Umayyads fled their capital of Damascus to settle 
in al-Andalus. They brought with them invaluable knowledge and attracted a retinue 
of experts that helped the region connect with a wide array of trading centers and 
led to a period of great economic prosperity where Muslims, Christians, and Jews 
lived together in relative peace known in Spanish as the convivencia.  
Describing how the Great Mosque of Cordoba was modeled after the Great 
Mosque of Damascus, Menocal (2002) considers its orientation south instead of 
east to face Mecca, as though it was located in Damascus, as “a conscious 
continuation of what had been destroyed in Syria,” and a symbolic expression of 
“the Umayyad’s care not to destroy a multiethnic and religiously pluralistic state” 
(pp. 58-59). Ironically, there had first been a Roman temple on the Cordoba site; 
the temple was converted into a church by invading Visigoths in 572, and the church 
was demolished and completely rebuilt into the Great Mosque in 784, and then 
converted into a Catholic church in 1236 leading up to the Reconquista.  
The spiritual ideas of Islam were appealing to North Africans but were also 
used for political purposes as throughout the empire. North African Amazigh 
groups proved themselves adept at making scholarly arguments of jurisprudence 
based on Islamic law to assert their rights, a practice that resulted in a rich Islamic 
competition of ideas as well as a struggle for supremacy. 
 
The Amazigh Imperial Age: The Almoravids and Almohads 
Throughout the 10th century, Umayyad Andalusian ideas and practices 
diffused across the Maghreb, especially in Morocco (Naylor, 2009, p. 76). The 
success of Umayyad Andalusia gave rise to the Amazigh Almoravids (1053-1147) 
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and Almohads (1147-1269), “two of the most powerful states in the history of 
Western civilization’s Middle Ages” (Naylor, 2009, p. 7). These two Amazigh 
Muslim empires united North Africa with al-Andalus, Tamazight becoming the 
language of the palace in the Almohad period and being used for explaining the 
Qur’an and hadiths (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 168). As Bennison (2016) stresses, 
while frequently “lumped together under the rubric ‘Berber,’ the Almoravids and 
Almohads drew their support from opposed and linguistically distinct groups of 
tribes in North Africa”; and at the same time, both dynasties represented “the 
maturing of an Islamic society in the Maghrib” (pp. 4-5).  
The Almoravids and Almohads left an impressive array of architecture across 
their empires. This included creating symbols of power through monumental 
architecture and relocating, rebuilding, and repurposing as a means for legitimizing 
their authority (Rosser-Owen, 2014, p. 152). Contrary to historiography that has 
tended to vilify Amazigh African tribes for destroying a more “civilized” Europe or 
simply mimicking their art and architecture, the extensive and intensive cultural 
exchange between al-Andalus and North Africa went in both directions (Carillo, 
2014, p. 68).  
The Almoravids, a confederation of Sanhaja Amazigh tribes, first consolidated 
their power and wealth by controlling the Saharan trade and in military excursions 
against the Soninke kingdom of Ghana (Naylor, 2009, pp. 89-90). The Almoravid 
rulers recognized the Abbasids as the spiritual leaders of Islam, but they looked to 
Umayyad civilization and the Maliki school of jurisprudence for political and 
cultural exemplars. They made Marrakech their capital in 1070, developed the water 
supply, and created a unique layout where the ruler’s residence was not placed 
adjacent to the great Mosque as had been the Umayyad tradition in Damascus and 
Cordoba, an indication that their empire represented something new and perhaps 
more egalitarian. The still-standing Qubbat al-Ba‘diyyin is an exceptional example 
of the ingenious and original style of the Almoravid period (Bennison, 2016, p. 
294). 
In asserting their power and expanding their rule, the rival Almoravids and 
Almohads each claimed to be more religiously faithful than the other, but each also 
went to great effort to deliberately evoke symbols of their predecessor’s 
accomplishments (Bennison, 2014, p. 143). For example, the Almoravids 
remodeled the miḥrāb of the Qarawiyyn mosque in Fez after the one in Cordoba, 
and both the Almoravids and the Almohads transported numerous columns over 
800 kilometers from the famous Madinat al-Zahra ruins in Cordoba to Marrakesh 
(Rosser-Owen, 2014, p. 157, 174). The Almohads were extremely ambitious 
builders, expanding cities, installing new hydraulic water systems, irrigating 
orchard plantations, establishing hospitals, and building imperial fortresses, 
gateways, and mosques with distinctively large square minarets. They destroyed 
and rebuilt many Almoravid mosques claiming that they were incorrectly oriented 
towards Mecca, further asserting their righteousness and power (Rosser-Owen, 
2014, p. 182). Still, many of their designs also evoked Cordoba’s influences. For 
Amira Bennison (2016), the Almohad period demonstrated a true artistic cultural 
synthesis, as Andalusi and Maghrebi craftsmen worked together on projects on both 
sides of the straits, setting a tone for the art and architecture of both regions for 
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centuries to come (pp. 320, 328). The imperial cities of the Almoravid and Almohad 
dynasties were impressive, and many of the Almohad structures are still in use 
today. 
Both empires used religion as a mechanism for extending their control and 
asserting the ruler’s religious authority, a process that elicited a strong grassroots 
response in the form of Sufism. Sufi practice emphasized ritual retreat, fasting, and 
meditation to commune with God. It was “Maliki juridical cliques whose receipt of 
state patronage and exercise of religious power . . . often seemed self-serving rather 
than righteous” that led to the increased appeal of Sufi mysticism and asceticism, 
including the Sufi notion of the divinely inspired guide or charismatic holy man 
(Bennison, 2016, pp. 238-39). The Almohads were fervent critics of the Almoravids 
and are noteworthy for their ideological zealotry for instance in recognizing their 
messianic leader Ibn Tumart as the mahdī, or the one sent to restore true Islam. 
Bennison (2014) writes, “The Almohads viewed their message not simply as 
revived and restored Islam, but as pure Abrahamic monotheism (tawhid) which all 
Muslims, Christians and Jews should accept” (p. 148). Thus, in violation of the 
dhimma, they prohibited Jews and Christians from practicing their religion 
(Gottreich & Schroeter, 2011, p. 13). Ironically, the rising power and attraction of 
Sufi charismatic leaders may have contributed to Ibn Tumart’s assertion of 
infallibility as mahdī, as well as to the Almohad emphasis on a source-based 
approach to law rather than the commentary-based Maliki approach (Bennison, 
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2016, pp. 253, 257-58, 274). This Islamic competition of ideas encompassed 
different notions of religious practice, legal schools, and leadership styles. 
One of the leading philosophical protagonists within these debates was Ibn 
Rushd al-Hafid (1126-1198), also known as Averroes, who served as a judge and 
court physician. The “quintessential Almohad intellectual,” he wrote extensively 
about many subjects including philosophy, theology, medicine, astronomy, physics, 
law, and linguistics. His philosophical works include commentaries on Aristotle 
that were very influential among Jewish and Christian scholars including his 
contemporary, Moses ben Maimon, also known as Musa ibn Maymum or 
Maimonides (1138-1204), who lived and worked in Morocco before migrating to 
Egypt (Bennison, 2016, pp. 261-62).  
The Amazigh were not simple rebel nomads, but intellectual rulers of a vast 
empire. As Bennison (2014) describes the change, “by the end of the Almohad rule, 
the idea of normative urban-based Islamic rule had become generalized throughout 
the Maghreb and the sectarian tribal landscape of preceding centuries had changed 
dramatically and permanently” (p. 154). Conflict increased as urban-based centers 
attempted to expand their power and control. Unfortunately, increased military 
conflict between Castilian Christians and the Almoravid and Almohad Islamic 
empires in Iberia/Andalusia saw the rise of a crusade-based and jihad-based 
political paradigm (Bennison, 2016, p. 19). More and more, “politicized Islam and 
Christianity narrowed perspectives and produced ‘misreceptions’ and 
misperceptions of others” (Naylor, 2009, p. 106). Thus, religious intolerance 
increasingly became a weapon for empire building among competing Christian and 
Islamic states. 
After the Almohads were defeated and pushed out of al-Andalus, they faced 
rising competition in the Maghreb, and were eventually defeated and succeeded by 
the Marinids (1269-1465). Unlike their predecessors, the Marinids were not a 
sharifian dynasty that claimed ancestry from the Prophet (Naylor, 2009, p. 98). 
They were, however, actively involved in the gold trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and provided support to the last remaining Islamic kingdom in Andalusia, the 
Nasrids of Granada. Granada did not surrender until 1492, ending nearly 800 years 
of Islamic rule in al-Andalus. The Marinids re-established the Maliki school in their 
capital of Fez and were known for building large madrasas, including one that 
featured an extraordinary mechanical water-clock (Blair & Bloom, 1994, p. 122). 
Thus, carrying on Fez’s tradition as a seat of learning—the oldest existing and 
continually operating educational institution in the world being the University of al-
Qarawiyyin, founded in 859 AD by a Muslim woman, Fatima al-Fihri.  
 
A Cosmopolitan Era 
It was during the period of Marinid rule that two very influential North African 
luminaries left their mark: Ibn Battuta and Ibn Khaldun. Born into a family of legal 
scholars in Tangier during the Marinid dynasty, Ibn Battuta (1304-1368) is the 
greatest traveler of premodern times. Far exceeding Marco Polo, he traveled 
approximately 73,000 miles and visited more than 40 different lands, including 
Spain, China, Kazakhstan, Tanzania, and Mali. His narrative story of this grand 
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tour, or rihla, reports on a wide variety of political events, human geography, and 
social and economic conditions in great detail (Dunn, 1986, pp. 1-5).  
Ibn Battuta studied in the Maliki school of jurisprudence and was also 
influenced and interested in Sufism, which recognizes the possibility of achieving 
a direct personal communion with God. Sufi saints, known as marabouts in the 
Maghreb, attracted many followers. Today, their tombs dot the rural and urban 
landscape of the Maghreb and are major pilgrimage sites (Zillinger, 2014, p. 41). In 
many ways, his traveling career represented a grand world tour of the lodges and 
tombs of famous Sufi mystics and saints (Dunn, 1986, pp. 22-24). 
The scholarly class of the Islamic world was an extraordinarily mobile group, 
connecting Islamic centers of study and worship with its distant outposts (Dunn, 
1986, p. 24). Ibn Battuta, who spent eight years in India serving as a judge in the 
Sultanate of Delhi, exemplified this practice. According to Ross Dunn (1986), 
 
[m]embers of this cultural elite who were living and traveling in the further 
regions consistently maintained close ties with the great cities of the 
central Islamic lands, thereby creating not merely a scattering of literate 
and skilled Muslims across the hemisphere, but an integrated, growing, 
self-replenishing network of cultural communication . . . Islam tended to 
encourage a higher degree of social mobility and freer movement of 
individuals from one city and region to another than was the case in the 
other civilizations of that time. Islamic culture put great stress on 
egalitarian behavior in social relations based on the ideal of a community 
of believers (the umma) having a common allegiance to one God and his 
Sacred Law. To be sure, a great gulf separated the rich and powerful from 
the poor and weak, as was the case in all civilized societies until very 
recent times. But Islam mightily resisted the institutionalizing of ascribed 
statuses, ethnic exclusivities, or purely territorial loyalties. (p. 10) 
 
Originally from the area of Tunisia, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), author of the Kitab 
al-‘Ibar, a history of Amazigh North Africa under Islamic rule, put forth in the 
Muqaddima (introduction) an influential theory of political world history. 
According to Bennison (2016), Ibn Khaldun argued in this work that “government 
preserved humankind from savagery,” but civilization “fostered an effete, decadent 
and morally questionable lifestyle in comparison with the simple, virtuous and 
hardy ways of the tribes” (pp. 6-7). In some ways, this theory asserted the necessity 
for ruling groups to be replenished by incorporating new or previously 
disenfranchised groups into society. Ibn Khaldun, considering the specific case of 
the Almoravids and Almohads, believed that tribal differences were surmounted 
“by a charismatic leader with a particular religious message,” as was certainly the 
case of Ibn Tumart (Bennison, 2016, p. 7). 
 
European Imperialism and Colonial Rule 
As Islamic rule ended in the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal and Spain embarked 
on an Age of Discovery that entailed establishing control of the high seas. 
Sanctioned by Papal Bulls (decrees) such as the Dum diversas of 1452, the Catholic 
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Church encouraged an aggressive approach that would “vanquish and subdue all 
Saracens (Muslims) and pagans and other enemies of Christ, to reduce their persons 
to perpetual slavery, and to convert to Christianity” (Ghazanfar, 2016, p. 43). As 
Lambert (2005) explains, “When Spain expelled Muslims from Iberia, that 
Christian power confiscated their property, denied the Barbary powers favorable 
trading terms, raided their territory, and enslaved their people” (p. 109). The 1494 
Treaty of Tordesillas fixed a boundary between the competing Portuguese and 
Spanish empires that, in part, allowed Spain and Portugal to fight together against 
the Ottomans and Arabs in the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas in order to 
monopolize the Atlantic and Indian Ocean trade routes to Asia and Africa. Figuring 
prominently in this effort, the Strait of Gibraltar was always a disorderly and highly 
contested space (Pennell, 2001, p. 55). 
The Portuguese exploited the intense rivalry between Morocco’s closely 
related Zanata Marinids and Zanata Wattasids (1465-1554) to seize control of 
Ceuta, the entrance to the Mediterranean, in 1415. In 1437, an expedition 
commanded by Prince Henry of Portugal was surrounded by Moroccan forces at 
Tangier and allowed to return to their ships only upon the promise to surrender 
Ceuta. Prince Henry’s younger brother Dom Ferdinand was held hostage and died 
in prison in Fez, since the promise to surrender Ceuta was never fulfilled (Boxer, 
1975, p. 26). The Portuguese later took al-Qasr al-Saghir, Tangier, and Arzila but 
were expelled from Agadir in 1541 by Morocco’s Sa‘adi (1549-1654) sharifian 
dynasty. The Sa‘adi forced the Portuguese to abandon the cities of Safi and 
Azenmour, thereby reopening the Atlantic coasts to Moroccan commerce (Naylor, 
2009, p. 124). The Wattasids, allied with the Ottomans, briefly occupied Fez, but 
were also defeated by the Sa‘adi. Ottoman incursions in Morocco led the Sa‘adi to 
pursue a strategic alliance with Spain. At the same time, the Sa‘adi extended their 
control over the Saharan trade routes. They also continued the emphasis of 
incorporating water features within their urban architecture, adding many public 
fountains (Blair & Bloom, 1994a, p. 260).  
The Battle of the Three Kings (1578) resulted in the death of the childless King 
Sebastian of Portugal, his ally the deposed Moroccan sultan, al-Mutawakkil, and 
the Sa‘adi Sultan Abd al-Malik. The Sa‘adi victory resulted in Abd al-Malik’s 
brother Ahmad al-Mansur becoming the next ruler of Morocco. The rule of Sultan 
al-Mansur “protected Morocco from the predations and ambitions of Spain and the 
Ottoman Empire” (Naylor, 2009, p. 26). He created the makhzan, a term connoting 
the central organization of government administration. Contrary to the colonial and 
post-colonial discourse of decline often used to characterize non-Western responses 
to the onslaught of European imperialism, Moroccan responses demonstrated a 
resiliency distinguished by cautious strategic thinking and selective appropriation 
of new ideas and technologies, with the Sultans often taking the lead in initiating 
modernizing reforms (Miller, 2013, p. 29). At the same time, European alliances 
grew in the face of such ambitions. For example, in 1662, the cities of Tangier and 
Mumbai became dowry gifts from Katherine of Braganza in her marriage to Charles 
II providing a critical link between the Portuguese and British empires. 
The Sa‘adi and Alawi (1654-present) sharifian dynasties implemented 
numerous reforms and generally managed to protect Morocco from incursions by 
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the Ottomans, Portuguese, and Spanish. One of the most famous Alawi Sultans, 
Mawlay Isma‘il, whose mother was from sub-Saharan Africa, raised a large 
professional army known as the “Black Guard” with an elite cavalry unit, 
constructed a corsair fleet to assert Moroccan power in the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean, moved the capital to Meknes, and made an offer of marriage to 
Louis XIV’s daughter (Bennison, 2002, pp. 27-28; Blair & Bloom, 1994a, p. 260). 
During his reign, the Alawi pushed back Portuguese and Spanish positions on the 
African continent (El Jadida, Sebta, Melilla, Peñón de Alhucemas) (Sater, 2010, p. 
4).  
 
Moroccan Dynasties 
Idrisid 789-920 
Fatimid Rule 922-974 
Umayyad Andalus Rule  974-1040 
Almoravid 1040-1147 
Almohad 1124-1269 
Marinid  1248-1465 
Idrisid interlude  1465-1471 
Wattasid 1471-1554 
Saadi  1549-1659 
Dila'i interlude 1659-1663 
Alawi 1666-present 
 
The death of Sultan Isma‘il was followed by prolonged civil war (his son was 
deposed five times during his 30-year reign) which led to other endemic problems 
that greatly weakened the state and resulted in the navy being disbanded. Isma‘il’s 
grandson, Muhammed III (reigned 1757-1790), however, was a great reformer who 
sent numerous emissaries to learn from the Ottoman court in Istanbul. Believing 
that peaceful commerce with Europe was wiser than continuous warfare, he 
implemented new duties on overseas trade and rebuilt the port of Essaouira on the 
Atlantic coast to promote trade (Miller, 2013, pp. 8-10). 
Muhammed III was the first head of state to recognize the United States as an 
independent nation. Morocco was also the first nation in the world to recognize the 
new U.S. Constitution of 1787 and to address George Washington as the first 
elected president. It can therefore be said that Morocco has the oldest, unbroken, 
perpetual treaty of friendship and peace with the United States (Tise, 2005). This 
relationship was brought about, in part, due to the activities of the Barbary corsairs 
(Lambert, 2005, pp. 50-59).  
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In the Mediterranean, Barbary corsairs, the majority of whom were European 
exiles from the Iberian Peninsula, operated primarily out of Algiers, Tunis, and 
Tripoli as regencies of the Ottoman Empire. Historically, European corsairs were 
also active throughout the Mediterranean and attacked North African shipping 
interests. Both groups engaged in seizing cargo and enslaving and ransoming 
captives. In Morocco, the port of Salé (Rabat) also had active groups of corsairs. In 
the early 17th century, 70 to 80 European ships were being captured annually 
(Weiss, 2011, pp. 7-11). As shipping raids increased, European powers began 
paying tribute to North African rulers, negotiating individual treaties with the Sultan 
of Morocco and Ottoman regencies, in order to ensure safe passage. Similarly, what 
came to be known as privateers, not unlike corsairs, became an institutionalized 
form of piracy licensed by governments to disrupt as well as carry out military and 
commercial activities. European states recognized the corsairs as privateers and 
even financed some Barbary corsair expeditions. The American colonies relied 
heavily on privateers during the War of Independence, with 2,500 mercenary ships 
deployed against British shipping (Silverstein, 2005, pp. 184-187). Military 
competition over trade routes at sea was at its height in the period. 
Ratified by the U.S. Congress in 1787, the Treaty with Morocco established 
free trade without tribute between the two nations. It was hoped that this treaty 
would be a model that the United States could take to the other Barbary powers 
(Lambert, 2005, p. 59). But this was not to be. Between 1785 and 1796, Algerian 
corsairs captured thirteen American ships and held more than 100 Americans 
ransom. The United States eventually agreed to pay $600,000 in ransom for the 
captives and in tribute, to buy peace. The new nation soon negotiated other treaties, 
bringing the total cost to $1.25 million or 20% of the U.S. federal government’s 
annual budget (Lambert, 2005, p. 93). This eventually led to the Tripolitan War 
(1801-1805), as the United States decided to fight rather than continue paying 
tribute (Silverstein, 2005, p. 181). Significantly, it also contributed to deeper 
questioning of slavery in America, for in 1800 there were 750,000 Africans and 
people of African descent enslaved in America, compared to a few hundred 
Americans enslaved in North Africa (Lambert, 2005, pp. 120-121). 
Muhammed III’s extensive reforms challenged the status and privileges of the 
elite religious classes, who eventually enlisted the Sultan’s son, Yazid, to lead their 
opposition. Following Yazid’s short rule, Muhammed III’s second son, Sulayman, 
continued reversing his father’s policies, attempting to close the doors on trade and 
interaction with Europe (Miller, 2013, p. 11). A distinguishing characteristic of 
hereditary monarchies is generational with a distinct and unpredictable rhythm of 
change. How and which issues each ruler addresses is based on their unique 
experiences, skills, and interests. They do not always follow their predecessor’s 
footsteps, but they often learn lessons from their missteps.  
Sulayman’s successor, his nephew Abd al-Rahman (reigned 1822-1859), 
suffered significant military defeats and was forced to recognize that Morocco had 
fallen far behind Europe in terms of its military capability as well as in industrial 
technology and manufacturing. Abd al-Rahman’s son, Muhammad IV (reigned 
1859 to 1873), who commanded the Moroccan army defeated by the French at the 
Battle of Isly in August 1844, launched a series of military reforms establishing the 
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first European-styled regiment, building a munitions factory and setting up a 
military training school in Fez; however, tribal resistance to foreign intrusions 
remained the most effective line of defense (Sater, 2010, p. 13). Unfortunately, 
following raids by Anjera tribesmen on a Spanish garrison at Ceuta, Spain, declared 
war. The Spanish-Moroccan War (1859-1860) included naval bombardment of 
Tangier, Asilah, and Tetouan and resulted in widespread devastation. The British, 
concerned about Spanish occupation, brokered a treaty that imposed a crippling 
indemnity payment on Morocco and that was paid from custom tariffs collected by 
Spanish authorities stationed in the ports (Miller, 2013, pp. 24-25).  
From the time of the French conquest of Algeria in 1830 until the establishment 
of the protectorate in 1912, Morocco was constantly under threat by European 
powers looking to establish a greater colonial presence. The severe and conclusive 
military defeats to France in Algeria in 1830 and 1844 and to the Spanish in 
Morocco in 1860 made clear the immense disparity in the military might of the 
Maghreb and its European neighbors pressuring the Alawi monarchy to accept 
preferential commercial treaties and eventually colonial rule. The first such treaty 
was with Britain in 1856, which the Sultan knew was keen to press any advantage 
in its rivalry with the French. One of the most problematic terms of the treaty 
provided the extension of legal protection to any foreigner involved in a dispute 
who could choose to have the case heard in a consular rather than a Moroccan court. 
The status of protégé, or protected person, grew quickly to include Moroccan 
citizens employed by foreign enterprises (Miller, 2013, p. 23). Most of the 
Moroccan protégés were successful merchants and entrepreneurs who operated 
within legal frameworks, but others operated illegally in exploitive and banned 
activities. Miller (2013) reports that notably, “while Jews figured disproportionately 
among the protégés, they were no means the majority. Most Jews who benefitted 
from the practice were bankers and wealthy merchants, while the mass of Jews—
poor artisans, shopkeepers and laborers—were not affected at all” (pp. 43-44).  
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 shortened the distance from Europe to 
India via the Mediterranean, further heightening tensions and rivalries throughout 
the region. The British went to war with Egyptian nationalists in 1882 to establish 
outright control of the canal and surrounding territory (Anderson, 2013, p. 55). The 
intense competition for world power led to the 1884 Berlin Conference and the 
“Scramble for Africa” during which the continent was divided into spheres of 
influence among the European powers. Miller (2013) further elucidates: “when 
British-French rivalry ceased due to Germany’s increased colonial ambitions under 
Wilhelm II (1888-1918), Morocco’s independence was far less secure, opening the 
way for French colonial ambitions in North-West Africa” (p. 15). The Entente 
Cordiale of 1904 between Britain and France gave Britain a free hand in Egypt, and 
France the right to “preserve order” and “provide assistance” in Morocco (Miller, 
2013, p. 72). 
Hassan I (reigned 1873-1894) continued Muhammed IV’s emphasis on 
military and administrative reforms, further organizing and modernizing a 
professional corps of ministerial and managerial roles. This included sending 
students abroad for training and building a cadre of professionals who could deal 
effectively with Europeans. Most famously, he organized regular annual tours of 
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the countryside to project his authority, during which he was accompanied by as 
many as 15,000 soldiers, court officials, traders, and staff. The impressive show of 
force and commercial benefits of these local diplomatic expeditions were aimed at 
reducing conflict within the empire (Miller, 2013, pp. 34-37). However, growing 
inequalities due to expanded contact with Europe and the inflationary pressure of 
foreign capital exacerbated rising tensions and competition within the empire 
(Miller, 2013, p. 53). As Miller (2013) highlights, “Morocco was [gradually] 
transformed into another subaltern state feeding European expansion by offering 
raw materials, cheap labor, and unprotected markets” (p. 27). Moreover, Europe’s 
“civilizing mission” sanctioned intervention on behalf of subjugated peoples 
everywhere and drove increased militancy in Morocco as elsewhere (Miller, 2013, 
p. 55). Morocco’s annual trade deficit reached 14 million francs annually by 1902, 
and a French loan of 62.5 million francs in 1904 was a clear sign of the Moroccan 
state’s financial crisis (Miller, 2013, pp. 61-63).  
The Acts of Algeciras of 1906, brought on by European imperial ambitions and 
brokered unsuccessfully by Theodore Roosevelt, was signed by Sultan Moulay Abd 
al-Aziz (reigned 1894-1908) (Naylor, 2009, p. 162). It stipulated greater foreign 
economic presence and administrative authority in Morocco, especially in the port 
cities, and led to the overthrow of the sultan in 1908. In an unprecedented move, 
the bay‘a (oath of allegiance) issued by the ulama (religious scholars) imposed 
terms on the new sultan, Moulay Abd al-Hafid, requiring him to abrogate the 
Algeciras Act, restore Morocco’s territorial integrity, and expel French troops from 
Casablanca and Ouja (Miller, 2013, p. 77; Naylor, 2009, p. 16). This proved an 
impossible task and only served to increase French pressure. On March 30, 1912, 
Abd al-Hafid signed the Treaty of Fez, making Morocco a French protectorate. The 
Fez Riots took place in the capital two weeks later. The Jewish quarter was leveled 
before order was restored, when French artillery shelled the centers of resistance in 
the city and forced insurrectionaries to surrender. In the end, 66 Europeans, 42 Jews, 
and some 600 Moroccans were killed, and Sultan Abd al-Hafid abdicated his throne 
(Gershovich, 2000, p. 57). French colonial rule in Morocco would last for the next 
44 years.  
Generally, French colonial practice in Morocco, especially under Resident-
General Hubert Lyautey’s administration, aimed “to work with, not against, native 
socio-political elites and respect pre-colonial customs and traditions. . . . [Preserving 
the Sultanate] put the traditional sources of power and its administration at the 
disposal of the French. This [however] had the potential to seriously delegitimize 
the monarchy in the eyes of the [burgeoning] nationalist movement” (Sater, 2010, 
p. 5). The Resident-General signed all royal edicts in the name of the sharifian 
government (Laskier & Bashan, 2003, p. 473). In reality, there existed two systems: 
the sultan managing a simplified and stripped down, mainly religious, cultural 
affairs division; and the French governing a large technocratic state bureaucracy 
(Miller, 2013, p. 91). As exemplified in the 1930 “Berber Dahir (decree),” the 
French also pursued a divide-and-rule strategy that aimed at splitting traditional ties 
between Arab and Amazigh communities (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 166). In 
general, colonialism emphasized the physical segregation of ethnic, social, and 
cultural groups (King, 1976, p. 7). Special schools for Amazigh taught entirely in 
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French were established, and all legal matters occurring in Amazigh territory were 
placed under French jurisdiction rather than in shari’a courts (Naylor, 2009, pp. 19-
20). Relatedly, language policy in schools has been a crucial on-going issue in the 
formation of national identity ever since this time. 
The Spanish also acquired colonial rule over portions of northern Morocco in 
1912, and it was here that some of the strongest resistance occurred with the 
establishment of the independent Rifian Republic in 1921. The Rif region had been 
a site of resistance for centuries, as highlighted by a 1799 treaty between Morocco 
and Spain that acknowledged the inability of the sultan to prevent local people from 
attacking the Spanish and therefore excluded the region from the treaty (Pennell, 
2001, p. 58). Fighting lasted until 1926, when French forces entered the conflict. It 
took more than 150,000 colonial soldiers to defeat the 40,000 Rifian troops. 
Moreover, “the French unleashed a barrage of modern weaponry perfected during 
World War I with terrifying effect – aerial bombardment, poison gas and armored 
tanks and cars” (Miller, 2013, pp. 104-110). Ironically, during the Spanish Civil 
War (1936-1939), Francisco Franco used northern Morocco as a staging area and 
hired nearly 80,000 Moroccan mercenaries (Miller, 2013, p. 137). The Rif has been 
the site of uprisings and protests ever since. In 1959, Crown Prince Hassan 
commanded the newly formed Forces Armées Royales to try to crush a Rifian revolt 
that had begun in 1957.  
Large numbers of French settlers began arriving in Morocco following World 
War I. They worked not only in construction but also in managerial and professional 
roles. Some became large landowners. They built the new port of Casablanca, a 
railroad system, major dams, a massive electric grid, and developed mining 
concessions (Miller, 2013, pp. 111-113). By the 1940s, the population of European 
settlers in Morocco reached 400,000 (Laskier & Bashan, 2003, p. 474). Ironically, 
colonial rule, imposed from outside, necessitated increased consultation and power 
sharing within Morocco. It opened up spaces for previous non-state actors to voice 
concerns and called for a deep questioning of Moroccan society and values.  
 
The Jewish Experience in Morocco 
The Jewish community in Morocco is one of the oldest in the world dating as 
far back as the destruction of the first temple in 586 BCE, or perhaps even the time 
of Phoenician traders (7th century BCE) or the time of King Solomon (10th Century 
BCE). By the time of the Roman Empire, they were a well-established community, 
later known as the toshavim, or “original residents.” In addition to these ancient 
Jewish communities, large numbers of Sephardic Jews, known as megorashim, the 
expelled, arrived in Morocco from the Iberian Peninsula along with Muslim exiles 
escaping persecution during the 15th century. These two groups did not always get 
along well together (Kenbib, 2011, p. 27).  
These Moroccan Jewish communities spoke Judeo-Arabic and Amazigh 
languages depending on which region of the country they lived. As dhimmi, they 
had a protected status that provided them with some rights (freedom of worship, 
property ownership) and a degree of administrative autonomy. Most lived in 
segregated walled city quarters with locked gates called mellahs and all were 
required to wear black clothing and a hairstyle different from Muslims. Their main 
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sources of livelihood were food production and farming (including making wine, 
forbidden by Islam), spice trading, butchering, tailoring, leatherwork, jewelry 
makers, blacksmithing, and woodworking. Most were poor or low income. The 
largest communities lived in Fez, Marrakesh, and Essaouira (Laskier & Bashan, 
2003, pp. 476-480). Muslim-Jewish relations varied considerably by place and time 
depending on local circumstances and exigencies (Kenbib, 2011, p. 26). 
The Jewish trading community had extensive ties throughout the 
Mediterranean and Islamic world extending all the way to India (Bennison, 2016, 
pp. 203-204). They thrived as partners with Arab traders (Nabhan, 2014, pp. 130-
132). Because of these important commercial relations, many were incorporated 
into the makhzan as key advisors and occasionally sent on diplomatic missions to 
Europe. In the 19th century, affluent Moroccan Jewish traders became influential 
royal merchants who leased government monopolies and port customs on key 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Wrytzen, 2015, pp. 180-182). Enmity 
against Jews increased during the 19th century and throughout the colonial period 
as they were increasingly seen as a privileged and protected class (Laskier & 
Bashan, 2003, p. 486).  
In 1860, French colonial administrators in Algeria allowed French language 
and culture schools for Jews operated by the Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU). 
As Wyrtzen (2015) relates, “the AIU encouraged the ‘moral progress’ and 
‘emancipation’ of Jews living in the Islamic world” (p. 183). The first such school 
in Morocco opened in 1862 in Tetouan and expanded to most other cities over the 
next two decades. These schools were open to girls and provided vocational 
training. In 1863, in part in response to British aristocrat Sir Moses Haim 
Montefiore’s visit, Sultan Muhammed IV issued a royal dahir (decree) ensuring 
equal justice under the law for all Jews. In 1870, the entire Jewish population of 
Algeria was given legal status as citizens of France (Miller, 2013, pp. 45-46). 
According to Laskier and Bashan (2003), “the Jewish press chronicled the 
deterioration of Jewish-Muslim relations since the 1860s that was partly the result 
of the growing French and British interest in Moroccan domestic affairs – and the 
increasing intervention of European Jews on behalf of Moroccan Jewish 
communities” (p. 485). This included philanthropic assistance to impoverished 
Jewish communities in overcrowded mellahs (Kenbib, 2011, p. 27). 
Rising nationalism and anti-Semitism in Europe prompted the Zionist 
movement of the late 1890s. Its idea spread to the colonies in the Middle East and 
North Africa gaining momentum after the 1917 Balfour Declaration (that promised 
to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine) and the divisions created by further 
partitioning of the region following World War I (see Fromkin, 1989). With the rise 
of Nazi-Germany, more than 300,000 Jews emigrated from Europe to Palestine 
between 1922 and 1936. During World War II, Mohammed V refused to sign the 
pro-Nazi Vichy regime’s plans to collect and deport Morocco’s quarter million Jews 
to the killing factories of Europe (Miller, 2013, p. 142). He is also purported to have 
responded to a Nazi commander demanding a list of Moroccan Jews that “We have 
no Jews in Morocco! Only Moroccan citizens” (Raoul Wallenberg Foundation, 
2009). 
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The question of Jewish statehood remained unresolved until after World War 
II when Israel declared independence in 1948, launching a regional war and the 
defeat of Arab forces (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 239-271). The rise and 
formation of the Jewish state coincided with the imposition and maintenance of 
colonial rule throughout the region. The impact for Morocco with its large Jewish 
community was highly disruptive. By 1948, the Jewish population in Morocco had 
risen to approximately 275,000 with the largest presence in Casablanca. Wrytzen 
(2015) reports, “while formally preserving the status of Moroccan Jews as subjects 
of the sultan, French administrators increasingly took direct control over them” (p. 
179).  
Amidst the complex circumstances of Zionism and looming Moroccan 
independence following World War II, a massive emigration ensued and deeply 
rooted Jewish communities vanished from the country (Kenbib, 2011, pp. 28-29). 
Laskier and Bashan (2003) estimate that between 1949-1956 90,000 Jews emigrated 
from Morocco to Israel under a semi-legal apparatus called Cadima, about 18,000 
thousand Jews were smuggled out illegally following Moroccan independence 
between 1956-1961, and about 80,000 left legally between 1961-1964 by chartered 
planes and ships under Operation Yakhin (pp. 499-502). By 1970, 230,000 
Moroccan Jews had settled in Israel (Laskier & Bashan, 2003, p. 502).  
André Levy (2015), sums up the developments that led to the migration of Jews 
from Morocco thusly: 
 
Modern historical processes, whose roots were in Europe, arrived in 
Morocco and created an irreversible disruption (in the daily life of the 
community) . . . first and foremost, from the Jews’ point of view, was the 
changes in the dhimmi status, even though it wasn’t abolished de jure, it 
ceased to be relevant de facto. This change was accompanied by a 
demographic process in which initially Jews moved around within 
Morocco; they left their villages and moved to the larger cities, situated 
mainly on the coast, with the intention to join the colonial project 
manifesting itself as inclusive and cosmopolitan. The Muslim majority 
saw this desire to join the colonial project as a betrayal of Moroccan 
nationalism . . . [as] Moroccan nationalism began shaping its collective 
identity as Arab and Muslim. Most of the Jews saw this move as an act of 
rejection. Zionist activity also contributed to the Jew’s disengagement 
from Morocco and to an even greater undermining of their sense of 
belonging, as Zionist activists encouraged Jews to emigrate. Israel’s 
chronic involvement in bloody conflicts with the Arab world also had its 
share of the effect on this outcome. (p. 178) 
  
Today, there are under 3,000 Jews living in Morocco, mostly in Casablanca 
(Eickelman, 2018).  
 
Independence Movement and the Monarchy 
Following World War II, the call for Moroccan independence (in concert with 
calls for decolonization around the world) increased significantly. In 1944, the 
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Istiqlal (independence) Party, led by Allal al-Fasi, called for an independent 
Morocco under the sultan and that the sultan should negotiate independence on 
Morocco’s behalf. Sultan Mohammed V gave an important speech in Tangier in 
1947 affirming the inalienable rights of the Moroccan people to self-rule and in 
1952 wrote a letter to the French president calling for the end of the protectorate 
that was decisively rejected. Meanwhile, widespread strikes and demonstrations 
resulted in violence and many deaths. Writes Wyrtzen (2015), “Between 1953-
1956, the Resistance [various urban guerrilla organizations] engaged in 4,250 
violent attacks in Morocco’s cities, primarily Casablanca, targeting infrastructure” 
(p. 277). France, desiring to maintain control over Morocco and faced with a 
national movement inextricably linked to the monarch, orchestrated with the help 
of the Grand Caid of Marrakech, Thami al-Glaoui, a petition that called for the 
deposition of the sultan. Demonstrating the effectiveness of the divide and rule 
strategy, the petition was signed by many other Amazigh leaders, who either feared 
urban nationalists or like Abd al-Hayy Kettani opposed Alawi rule (Sater, 2010, pp. 
21-23). Sultan Mohammed V was deposed and exiled first to Corsica and then to 
Madagascar in 1953. Exile served to heighten Mohammed V’s standing and 
strengthen the nationalist cause. France faced with other colonial conflicts in 
Tunisia and Algeria and increased riots and violence in Morocco, allowed his return 
to Morocco in 1955. Morocco gained its independence in 1956 and established a 
constitutional monarchy. The challenges facing the country at independence were 
significant. For example, 90% of the population was illiterate and only 15% of 
school-aged children were in school at the time of independence (Miller, 2013, pp. 
153-154). 
King Mohammed V adeptly managed a complex array of factions vying for 
influence in Morocco, both internally and externally. With keen attention to specific 
interests, he translated traditional symbolic legitimacy and his stature as 
Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Mu’minin) and defender of Moroccan 
nationalism into modern political alliances and popular support amidst often 
competing regional, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences. He worked with 
Amazigh leaders to create a post-independence alliance, suppressed Amazigh 
insurgents, integrated the Royal Armed Forces, reformed Sufi orders, controlled the 
most important ministries, and encouraged a multi-party system (Maddy-
Weitzman, 2011, p. 166; Naylor, 2009, p. 229). He died unexpectedly in 1961 with 
his son Hassan II succeeding him. 
Hassan II also navigated a complex and contested political landscape, including 
the rise of political Islam and an increasingly urbanized population. Most 
immediate, he had to build institutional capacity, and hence engaged in a process of 
decolonization that involved the nationalization of French-owned agricultural 
lands, Moroccanization of industry, and Arabization of education (Sater, 2010, pp. 
39-40).  
Over the course of five constitutions (1962, 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996), 
Hassan II gradually succeeded by associating politics with the traditional Islamic 
idea of shura consultation (Sater, 2010, p. 30). However, his early years were 
extremely difficult, as he provoked the inconclusive War of the Sands with Algeria 
(1963-64), dissolved parliament in 1965, instituted a state of emergency that lasted 
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five years, saw the kidnapping and murder of opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka 
in Paris, and survived two assassination attempts on his own life in 1971 and 1972 
(Naylor, 2009, p. 229). The first attempt occurred on Hassan II’s 42nd birthday 
party at his beachside palace and resulted in the death of 100 guests and 125 
wounded as well as 150 rebels killed and 900 held in custody. The second attempt 
involved an attack on a Royal Air Maroc flight by Moroccan fighter jets. The king’s 
bullet-riddled passenger jet miraculously landed safely. Both attempts were 
orchestrated by members of the Moroccan military (Miller, 2013, pp. 176-77).  
His survival, perceived by some as baraka (divine blessing or fortune), coupled 
with the politically savvy Green March of 1975, when 350,000 Moroccans armed 
only with the Koran entered the Western Sahara, secured popular nationalist support 
for the King (Sater, 2010, pp. 125-126). In the Tripartite Agreement of 1975, Spain 
gave Morocco and Mauritania administrative control over Western Sahara. In 1976, 
the indigenous Saharawi people, led by the Polisario Front, declared itself the 
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Mauritania withdrew from the 
agreement in 1979. Morocco withdrew from the Organization of African Unity 
when the OAU recognized the SADR in 1984. The 16-year insurgency ended with 
a UN-brokered truce in 1991 and the promise of a referendum on independence 
which has yet to take place (BBC, 2018).  
Numerous strikes and bread riots occurred in the 1980s throughout Morocco, 
in part due to International Monetary Fund and World Bank imposed austerities, 
removal of subsidies, and debt restructuring. Structural adjustment programs 
mandated the privatization of government--controlled monopolies that were bought 
by wealthy Moroccan elites with foreign partners. This neoliberal approach aimed 
to improve efficiencies, curtail corruption, and reduce mismanagement issues, but 
it also led to a shrinking of the public sector and increased unemployment (Miller, 
2013, pp. 185-186, 208-209).  
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Politics of Reform:  
Human Rights, Amazigh Rights, and Women’s Rights 
Human rights, Amazigh rights, and Women’s rights have been at the center of 
reforms since the 1990s. Organizational campaigns for change began as early as 
1984, when Christine Daure, wife of imprisoned dissident Abraham Serfaty, 
founded the Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Morocco. In 1988, this 
was followed by the founding of two additional organizations, the Moroccan 
Organization of Human Rights and the Moroccan Association of Human Rights 
(Miller, 2013, p. 201). In 1990, Gilles Perrault published an exposé titled Our 
Friend the King about corruption and human rights abuses in Morocco. These 
efforts forced a reevaluation by the King that led to significant reforms.  
Naylor (2009) states that, “after the ‘leaden years’ of the 1980s, which featured 
severe repression and infamous detention, King Hassan permitted a deliberate 
‘liberalization’ through reforms and amnesties during the 1990s” (p. 233). This 
included closure of the infamous Tazmamart prison and government creation of the 
Advisory Council for Human Rights in 1990 and the Ministry of Human Rights in 
1994. In May of 1994, seven members of the Telelli (Freedom) Cultural Association 
were arrested for unfurling banners promoting Amazigh language rights. Their 
harsh treatment provoked an avalanche of protest. In response, King Hassan II 
during his 1994 Throne Day speech broadcast on television recognized Amazigh 
language and culture as an authentic component of Moroccan identity. In 1995, he 
issued a royal decree calling for the teaching of Tamazight in public schools (Miller, 
2013, p. 196). However, it took nine more years before Tamazight was actually 
taught, in fall 2003, to first grade pupils in 300 schools (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, 
p. 171).  
The new constitution of 1992 explicitly confirmed adherence to “human rights 
as they are universally recognized” and led to parliamentary elections the following 
year that were touted as the freest since independence (Sater, 2010, p. 61). The 1996 
constitution created a bicameral parliament with the lower house directly elected, 
and where, during the following year, an Islamist party was allowed to put forth 
candidates for the first time. As Miller () stresses, “more important, however, was 
the unwritten understanding that the King would name a prime minister from the 
party having an electoral majority” (p. 205).  
Following Hassan II’s death in 1999 (he ruled for 38 years), his son, 
Mohammed VI, ascended to the throne and almost immediately accelerated political 
reforms with an emphasis on social welfare (Sater, 2010, p. 74). Within months, 
Mohammed VI fired the notorious Minister of the Interior Driss Basri and made a 
high-profile symbolic visit to the northern Rif Region where Amazigh protests and 
rebellions had been regular historical occurrences.  
The issuance in 2000 of a Berber Manifesto, the 2001 royal dahir establishing 
the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture, and Mohamed Chafik’s appointment as its 
leader were groundbreaking developments in Moroccan history and demonstrated 
the King’s commitment to ending Amazigh marginalization (Maddy-Weitzman, 
2011, p. 166). These steps were backed up by generous budgetary allocations for 
the institute. 
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As the “Berber Manifesto” made evidently clear, there was a long history of 
neglect and abuse to address. The hard work of educational and cultural change laid 
ahead. One of the unmet major demands of the Manifesto, was the recognition of 
Tamazight as an official language in the Moroccan constitution. No doubt, 
addressing the issue of Amazigh rights was part of a larger movement advocating 
for human rights and broader participation in public life. In this regard, the 
government sponsored 2004-2005 Equity and Reconciliation Commission which 
collected testimonies from people who survived torture while imprisoned during 
Hassan II’s reign. While those responsible were immune from prosecution, it was 
an unprecedented acknowledgement of wrong-doing. Said Miller (2013), “Overall, 
nearly ten thousand victims of the ‘years of lead’ received indemnities totaling more 
than $200 million” (p. 223). The process also showed that the majority of victims 
were Amazigh (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 155). In this effort and others, the 
Moroccan press also played a vibrant role providing an informative platform for 
public debate (Miller, 2013, p. 219). 
 
Women’s Movement and the February 20th Movement 
Women’s lives in Morocco are shaped by numerous factors including social 
class, geography, ethnicity, religion, and education. For example, women’s 
experience varies greatly depending on whether they live in cosmopolitan urban 
centers like Casablanca, Rabat, and Tangiers or whether they live in traditional rural 
settings. Still, in general, “compared to men, women in Morocco are less 
represented in decision-making processes and in areas such as education, health, 
and employment” (Gender Profile Morocco, n.d., p. 3). The 2015 World Economic 
Forum Global Gender Gap Index (2015) ranked Morocco 139 out of 145 countries 
in overall gender equity, with ranks of 140 and 123 in economic opportunity and 
educational attainment. The illiteracy rate for women in 2012 was 47.6% and much 
higher in rural areas (Gender Profile Morocco, n.d., p. 6).  
In the face of such changes, however, “the women’s movement not only 
advanced the cause of women; [but] it also had the electric effect of opening . . . 
new forms of debate associated with a more inclusive political culture” (Miller, 
2013, p. 194). As Salime (2012) underscores, “for two decades the movement had 
launched a sustained mobilization to challenge women’s secondary status in family 
law” (p. 103). In 1992, a campaign collecting one million signatures called for 
reform of the 1957 mudawwana, or family law. This led to a 1993 reform of the law 
that permitted women to sign an employment contract and obtain a passport on their 
own without male consent (Sater, 2010, p. 68-71). In 2004, the mudawwana was 
renamed the Family Code and additional changes stipulated that women have the 
right to marry without consent of a male guardian as well as the right to divorce 
(Gender Profile Morocco, n.d., p. 4). Recognized for its relatively progressive 
position on women’s rights within the Islamic world, the Family Code reforms have 
provided women with greater rights; however, awareness and implementation of 
the reforms have been limited by the lack of training of judges as well as social and 
religious conservatism, particularly in rural areas of the country (Eisenberg, 2011, 
p. 693). The law has been an insufficient mechanism when it comes to changing 
people’s attitudes and behaviors as local customs often conflict with the law. In 
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addition, ambiguities within the law can be interpreted as reinforcing patriarchal 
perspectives and gendered division of labor. Most significantly, despite the 2011 
constitutional reaffirmation of Morocco’s commitment to human rights as they are 
universally recognized, the sharia-based Family Code remains above international 
law (Elliott, 2014, pp. 16-25). 
Secular women’s movements in Morocco have tended to focus on working 
within the system for political and legal changes to expand and improve women’s 
rights and representation, whereas Islamist movements have tended to focus on 
social change at the grassroots level although at times opposing more feminist 
positions (Salime, 2012, pp. 107-109). No doubt, while legal codes that recognize 
women’s rights are important guideposts, absent widespread social attitudes that 
support and affirm women’s full participation in public life, systematic 
discrimination, and pervading attitudes prevent the implementation of greater 
equality. Therefore, Skalli (2011, p. 340) has emphasized that efforts to promote 
women’s rights should not be siloed in ways that look only at women or that are 
sponsored solely by women’s organizations, rather they must engage with an 
intersectionality of movements and issues. Nonetheless, it was women’s 
organizations that took the lead disseminating the code in darija (spoken Moroccan 
Arabic) and Amazigh dialects (Miller, 2013, p. 228). Since the February 20th 
movement (Morocco’s version of the Arab Spring), Salime (2012) asserts that 
“feminism has not only penetrated the social imaginary of a new generation of 
activists, but has also informed their practices” (p. 101). She sees “women and men 
working together as partners in the struggle for social and economic justice” 
(Salime, 2012, p. 105). Such joint efforts are especially prevalent in emerging forms 
of civic engagement through social media-based activism but are also increasingly 
prevalent in face-to-face interactions.   
The February 20th movement represented broad societal concerns that seek 
greater political representation, economic reform, and government accountability. 
As Zerhouni (2017) described, “the movement asked for a democratic constitution, 
the independence of the judiciary and the media as well as the separation of wealth 
and power” (p. 6). Growing unemployment, poverty, and inequity fueled 
dissatisfaction. Despite successive parliamentary elections since 1993, there is 
significant discontent with political parties and elected officials (Sater, 2010, p. 85). 
Furthermore, these officials were largely regarded as ineffective in a system that 
invested so much power with the king. Young people were especially active in the 
movement as they are keen to see substantive change; however, they do not tend to 
participate in elections at very high percentages. In 2002, the voting age was 
lowered from 20 to 18 years old. One of the few political parties with an active 
youth section, the Justice and Development Party (Islamist Party) won a majority 
of seats in the 2011 parliamentary elections obliging the King to select a prime 
minister from the party (Zerhouni, 2017, pp. 9-10). The king was also applauded 
for his quick response to the movement by putting forth a new constitution 
(approved on July 1, 2011 by 98.5% of voters, with nearly 10 million votes cast, 
representing close to 75% of the eligible electorate). The new constitution included 
changes that enhanced legislative powers, increased the judiciary’s independence, 
and limited the King’s ability to intervene in day-to-day politics (Miller, 2013, p. 
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235). Since 2011, within the lower house of the Moroccan parliament, a minimum 
of 60 seats out of 395 are reserved for women.  
 
Society and the Economy 
With a population of 35 million people, Morocco is rich with natural resources 
such as fish, phosphates, and fertile agricultural lands, but it struggles with rural 
poverty, urban unemployment, and illiteracy (Sater, 2010, p. 87-88). Primarily an 
agricultural economy, it also benefits from tourism and remittances. It has invested 
heavily in renewable energy. As entrepreneurship has grown and Morocco works 
to diversify its economy, there has also been increased attention given to fighting 
corruption (Sater, 2010, p. 104). Its annual gross domestic product is approximately 
$110 billion with a 4% growth rate and $8,600 per capita annual income. 
Unemployment is at 10%, the inflation rate is 1.6%, and 53% of the population is 
under 30 years of age. 
While Morocco has a trade deficit with Europe, it has benefitted by securing 
European Union (EU) capital and through market integration with Europe (70% of 
all its exports go to the EU). The EU has also linked foreign aid to human rights 
and democracy promotion, and Morocco is the primary recipient of EU aid in North 
Africa (Sater, 2010, p. 133). Mohammed VI’s doctoral thesis focused on the 
European Economic Commission and the Maghreb. 
EU relations are also important in regard to issues of migration. Nearly 3 
million Moroccans live in Europe (Miller, 2013, p. 232). Illegal Moroccan 
immigration results in tens of thousands of annual expulsions. In October 2005, 
thousands of Sub-Saharan migrants attempted to breach barbed wire fences at 
Melilla resulting in 13 deaths and hundreds wounded (Naylor, 2009, p. 236). For 
those interested in learning more about the personal circumstances of these 
migrants, Laila Lalami’s 2005 novel Hope and Other Dangerous Pursuits is 
insightful and engaging. 
King Mohammed VI has been a force for social change in Morocco supporting 
the efforts to improve and expand human rights, Amazigh rights, and women’s 
rights. Perhaps most important has been the king’s efforts at alleviating poverty and 
extending social welfare as was evident in the National Initiative for Human 
Development which received a $3.3 billion budget in 2007 and inaugurated 7,000 
projects (Sater, 2010, p. 83). Still, as the February 20th movement demonstrated, 
people are concerned about the economic effects of globalization, the concentration 
of wealth in the hands of a few elites, and the increased securitization of the state in 
the wake of high-profile terrorist attacks.  
 
U.S. Relations and the War on Terror 
Morocco’s cooperative and close relationship with the United States dates back 
to Mohammed III’s acknowledgement of the U.S. Declaration of Independence in 
1777 and the 1787 trade agreement. It found continued relevance when Theodore 
Roosevelt participated in the Algeciras Conference of 1906 (Potter, 1922, pp. 577-
583). Its importance was underscored again in the 1943 Casablanca Conference 
held in the Anfa hotel where Allied commanders met to coordinate the on-going 
war effort and discuss peace plans, including discussions related to decolonization 
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and Morocco’s independence (Miller, 2013, p. 144). Morocco also firmly allied 
with the United States during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. had 
several air bases, radar and communications installations, and a naval station in 
Morocco (Wyrtzen, 2015, p. 292).  
None of these examples are as straight forward as they appear. They all 
involved complex strategic calculations. More recently, as Miller (2013) has 
highlighted, “the U.S. steadily supplied arms to Morocco for its [Western] Saharan 
war, and in return, Morocco became a consistent supporter of U.S.-Middle East 
policies” (p. 209). Morocco also remained a staunch U.S. ally following invasions 
of Iraq and Afghanistan. Mohammed VI has cooperated with America’s “war on 
terror” and often faced criticism at home (Miller, 2013, pp. 224-225). However, 
high-profile terrorist attacks at or near home have informed this decision. Such 
attacks include a 1994 attack in Marrakesh that led to the closing of the Algerian 
border, a 2003 attack in Casablanca in which 45 people were killed (33 victims and 
12 suicide bombers), and the lethal Madrid bombings in 2004 that killed 191 people 
and injured 1,800 followed by the conviction of Moroccan and Tunisian nationals 
for carrying out the attack. Moroccans have been unequivocal in their rejection of 
such extremism. This may be best characterized by the Marrakesh Declaration of 
2016 that defends the rights and liberties of religious minorities in predominantly 
Muslim communities and rejects “the use of violence and armed struggle as a means 
for settling conflict and imposing one’s point of view.” 
 
This Volume 
Tracing Morocco’s diverse influences, powerful empires, cosmopolitan 
achievements, colonial resistance, and modern nation building efforts, the above 
essay provides a basis for further examination and understanding of these topics. 
Morocco is an active participant in today’s global society, facing challenges that are 
confronting every country and community, and that demand thoughtful and 
innovative responses. The essays in this volume provide a more in-depth analysis 
of Morocco, its history, cultural diversity, and changing contexts. 
This issue, then, begins with an article titled “Between the Line and the Circle: 
Ibn Khaldun’s View of History and Change” by Allen Fromherz that contextualizes 
the 14th century scholar’s views on historiography in ways that remain relevant 
today. It is followed by “The Ebbs and Flows of U.S.-Moroccan Relations in the 
Context of the Anfa Conference” by Karim Bejjit that meticulously reviews the 
conversations held between President Roosevelt and Sultan Mohamed V during 
WWII that helped set the stage for Moroccan Independence. The next two articles 
turn to the world of art. In “Moroccan Artistic Presence at the Centre Pompidou 
Collections,” Tunisian scholar, Sirine Abdelhedi shares a fascinating analysis on 
the “decolonization of the gaze” and how best to represent Morocco on the world 
stage. This piece is complemented by Samir El Azhar’s composition focused on 
“The Changing Roles of Female Visual Artists in Morocco” with its particular 
attention on how these artists have overcome prejudices, corrected misconceptions, 
and transgressed taboos. Next, two very different and powerful articles further 
question issues of changing identities in Morocco. The first, titled “’Your 
Opportunity to Hear Your Voice’: Akaliyat Magazine and the Creation of Queer 
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Community in Morocco" by Benjamin Ale-Ebrahim, looks specifically at an online 
journal’s attempt to build a greater sense of community as well as emerging 
coalitions across communities. The second article, “A Study of the Vernacular 
Literacy Practices of a Newly Literate Moroccan Woman: An Ethnographic 
Perspective” by Reddad Erguig examines the central role of the family in literacy 
acquisition. Continuing with the theme of language acquisition, Taoufik Jaafari 
considers the contentious landscape of language education policy in Morocco and 
its implications for the future. Delving deeper into educational and cultural policy, 
Brahim El Guabli describes “Moroccan Society’s Educational and Cultural Losses 
during The Years of Lead.” While difficult to quantify, an analysis of influential 
journals such as Lamalif as well as official reports such as those issued by the Equity 
and Reconciliation Commission shed light on this important topic. Maintaining a 
focus on national politics in “Moroccan Islamists Debate the Causes of Violent 
Extremism,” author Jack Kalpakian outlines the theological challenges posed by 
certain Wahhabi and Salafist views that reject mainstream Moroccan Islam and the 
implications for the government as it works to combat terrorism. Further examining 
the inner workings of Moroccan government, Zakaria Fatih, uses the prism of 
inclusive and extractive institutions to consider the makhzen’s effectiveness in 
terms of national development. While in “Empowering Rural Participation and 
Partnerships in Morocco’s Sustainable Development,” Yossef Ben-Meir analyzes 
the implementation of specific government policies. His assessment is based on a 
long career of working closely with rural communities. The final article in this 
volume by Touria Khannous considers Morocco through the influence of film and 
the transnational, with special attention to the complex role of women in society. 
Given the breadth and depth of subjects addressed in this volume, readers will no 
doubt come away with a strong understanding of Moroccan society and its 
important place in the world today. 
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